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I. INTRODUCTION
The era of weaponized drone warfare began in the deserts of
Yemen on November 3, 2002, when an American unmanned aerial
vehicle (“UAV”),1 otherwise known as a drone, blasted a car with a
Hellfire missile, killing all six occupants.2  The target of the attack was
suspected al Qaeda member Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, who was
believed to have been behind the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole while
it was docked in Yemen.3  Some critics were appalled at the attack,
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Author wishes to thank Susan
Felstiner, George Foster, Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Andy Laird-Johnson, Erin Ryan,
Juliet Stumpf, and Ozan Varol for helpful comments.
1. European authorities prefer the term “remotely-piloted aircraft.”
2. See, e.g., James Risen, Eyes (and Arms) in the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002,
at C5.
3. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Manhunt: The Bush Administration’s new strategy
in the war on terrorism, NEW YORKER, Dec. 23, 2002, at 66.
635
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calling it an “extra-judicial assassination,”4 particularly given that the
drone strike took place almost 1,700 miles away from the battlefield of
Afghanistan.5  Supporters of the attack, however, argued that it was a
precision strike undertaken with nobody else around, which elimi-
nated the chance of bystander casualties, that al-Harethi was allegedly
on his way to another terrorist strike, and that past efforts to capture
him alive had failed.6
Given the covert nature of the Central Intelligence Agency’s drone
program, available data on the number of drone strikes is unlikely to
be completely accurate.  It appears, however, that the al-Harethi at-
tack was the lone Yemen strike during the Bush Administration,
whereas the Obama Administration has since sent the number of
drone strikes in that country skyrocketing.7
Having opened Pandora’s Box, however, the United States may
soon find itself on the wrong end of a weaponized drone.  Drone tech-
nology has spread like wildfire not just to other countries, such as
Iran,8 but also to local agencies,9 private corporations,10 and even pri-
vate citizens.11  In late 2014, the Federal Aviation Administration ap-
proved the first set of permits for private commercial drone flights for
4. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on
Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 326, 331 (2003) (quoting critics such as Amnesty
International and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killing).
5. See, e.g., ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUS-
TICE 146 (2008) (criticizing the Bush Administration’s claim of executive authority
“that would allow the CIA to use an unmanned predator drone to fire a Hellfire
antitank missile in 2002 at a car in a remote part of Yemen, far from the Afghan
battlefield, killing six suspected al Qaeda operatives.”).
6. See Hersh, supra note 3, at 66.
7. See, e.g., Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis, NEW AM., http://securitydata.new
america.net/drones/yemen/analysis (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
8. See P.W. Singer, Defending Against Drones: How Our New Favorite Weapon
in the War on Terror Could Soon Be Turned Against Us, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2010, at
38.  CNN’s terrorism expert, Peter Bergen, has written that “82 countries now own
some type of drone . . . includ[ing] traditional American adversaries such as China,
Russia, and Iran.” Peter Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, Nine facts about armed drones,
CNN OPINION, May 13, 2014, available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/opinion/ber-
gen-nine-facts-spread-of-armed-drones/.
9. See, e.g., Sabrian Eaton, Ohio Agencies, School Defend Use of Drone Technol-
ogy, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 13, 2013, at A1.
10. Social media giant Facebook announced plans to build a fleet of drones that
would stay aloft indefinitely and provide wi-fi service to impoverished areas of the
world. See, e.g., Brian Fung, Everything You Need to Know About Facebook’s Drones,
Lasers and Satellites, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/28/everything-you-need-to-know-about-facebooks-
drones-lasers-and-satellites; Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook May Look to Drones to
Connect World to the Web, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/04/facebook-may-look-to-drones-to-connect-
world-to-the-web/. Internet retailer Amazon similarly disclosed that it was looking
into deploying drones to deliver packages to customers. See Keep the Tip, It’s Drone
Delivery: Editorial, OREGONIAN, Dec. 4, 2013, at B6, available at http://
www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/12/keep_the_tip_its_drone_deliver.html.
11. See Singer, supra note 8, at 39.
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Hollywood movie studios.12  With the cost of some commercial drones
at or below $1,000 in 2014,13 drone technology may well fall into the
hands of terrorists.14  Consider this scenario:
It is Opening Day of the baseball stadium and a sell-out crowd has
packed into Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles, California.  The sky is
blue and clear.  The temperature is mild, and the air is calm and still.
Five miles away, an unmanned aerial drone cruises toward the base-
ball stadium, directed by remote control by a pilot in a sport utility
vehicle on a California highway.  As the drone is about to cross over
the baseball stadium, the pilot presses a button on his remote-control
unit, and a flap in the rear of the drone opens.  The drone begins to
circle around the stadium, and a fine mist of white powder disperses
over the crowd.  Because of the calm air, the powder doesn’t blow
away; it just descends gently, blanketing the stadium.  The crowd
panics...
Does it matter if the white powder is weaponized anthrax, or sugar?
From the standpoint of terrorism, it is probably a difference in degree,
not kind.  That many people trying to escape such a tightly packed
venue could likely result in a dozens of injuries, if not deaths, from
trampling and stampeding.15  The realization that next time a drone
could be carrying something worse than sugar—ricin, radioactive ce-
sium, or asbestos—could frighten the public into avoiding mass out-
door venues; densely populated buildings like shopping malls might
fare equally badly.  A good indication that drone attacks may well be
on the minds of terrorists and other wrongdoers is the fact that, as of
2014, terrorist attacks involving drones have started to show up as plot
engines in popular culture.16  Before dismissing such novels and TV
shows as mere fiction, one might keep in mind that in 1994 not one,
12. Brooks Barnes, Drone Exemptions for Hollywood Pave the Way for Wide-
spread Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/09/26/business/media/drone-exemptions-for-hollywood-pave-the-way-for-wide
spread-use.html?_r=0.
13. See, e.g., Bill Turque, Montgomery County Studies Drone Applications, WASH.
POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/montgomery-county-
studies-drone-applications/2014/09/11/cec59038-39ec-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.
html.
14. See John Villasenor, Here Come the Drones: These popular, unmanned aircraft
will eventually fall into the hands of hostile nations and terrorists, SCI. AM., Jan. 2011,
at 16, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/here-come-the-drones/
(“As they continue to become smaller, cheaper[,] and more numerous, drones will
become easier for hostile nations, and perhaps even terrorists, to get their hands
on.”).
15. Cf. Scott Stewart, The Biggest Threat Dirty Bombs Pose is Panic, FORBES
(Sept. 11, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2014/09/11/the-biggest-
threat-dirty-bombs-pose-is-panic/ (suggesting that “it is possible the panic created by
a dirty bomb attack could well kill more people than the device itself.”).
16. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE, STING OF THE DRONE 81 (2014) (depicting
fictional terrorist plot to use remote-controlled aircraft replica to attack targets in the
continental U.S.); Hawaii 5-O: A’ohe Kahe e Pe’e Ai (CBS television broadcast Sept.
26, 2014) (depicting terrorist attack in Honolulu using a gun-armed drone); 24 Live
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but two novelists foreshadowed the 9/11 attacks, thrillers in which sui-
cide terrorists crashed planes into U.S. buildings.17
This Article considers the threat posed by drone terrorism and the
technological and legal issues involved in setting up defensive re-
sponses.  First, the Article provides an overview of current drone tech-
nology, legal views on weaponized military drones, and a discussion of
the potential appeal of drones as vehicles for terrorism.  Next, it dis-
cusses the current laws and regulations pertaining to private drones.
The Article then lays out the three challenges to defending against
drone terrorism: detecting potentially hostile drones, identifying them,
and destroying or neutralizing them.  Finally, it closes with some pro-
posals to begin to develop the legal and technological architecture to
defend against drone terrorism.
II. THE THREAT FROM DRONES
To begin with, this Article should distinguish the reality of drones
from the specter of them.  By “specter,” I mean that drones are some-
times used as shorthand for ideological or legal or policy disagree-
ments with a particular tactical or strategic course of action.18  For
example, the increasingly used tactic of targeting specific high-level al
Qaeda members for killing has led to a sharp debate, with opponents
decrying it as assassination and proponents arguing that such killings
comport with the law of war.19  But as Operation Neptune Spear—the
successful raid in Abottabod, Pakistan, that ultimately killed al Qaeda
leader Osama bin Laden—demonstrated, targeted killing need not be
accomplished by way of drone.20
A. Brief Primer on UAVs
Basically, UAVs are bigger, potentially more advanced versions of
the remote-controlled planes or helicopters sold in hobby stores, mall
kiosks, and Amazon.com as children’s toys.  The principles of flight
are the same as for manned aircraft or helicopters: The machine gen-
Another Day: 5:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. (Fox television broadcast June 9, 2014) (depicting
terrorist hijacking of armed U.S. drones and subsequent missile attack in London).
17. See TOM CLANCY, DEBT OF HONOR 762 (1994) (depicting a Japanese terrorist
crashing a hijacked jetliner into U.S. Capitol building); DALE BROWN, STORMING
HEAVEN 186–87 (1994) (depicting a terrorist crashing a plane into Memphis airport).
18. In this way, “drone” may be this decade’s version of the USA PATRIOT Act,
which Bush Administration critics frequently—and wrongly—identified as the source
of the Bush Administration’s claimed authority to detain combatants at Guantanamo
Bay or to engage in coercive interrogation. See Tung Yin, A Government’s Trustwor-
thiness: Beyond the USA PATRIOT Act, 8 CHI. POL’Y REV. 1 (2004).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See generally MARK BOWDEN, THE FINISH: THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN (2012) (reporting that a team of U.S. Navy special forces soldiers infiltrated
bin Laden’s house and killed him in a close-quarters firefight); MARK OWEN, NO
EASY DAY: THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF THE MISSION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN
LADEN 274 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL405.txt unknown Seq: 5 11-MAR-16 10:35
2015] DEFENDING AGAINST DRONE TERRORISM 639
erates enough lift to overcome its weight through either the interac-
tion of airflow across a curved wingfoil or tilted rotary blade.
Today’s drones come in a variety of sizes, ranging from ones that fit
in a person’s hand to ones as large as commercial jetliners.21  Not all
drones are operated by the military, and not all military drones are
combat aircraft.  In fact, most military drones are flown for surveil-
lance, an ideal purpose given their extended flight time, as some
UAVs can stay aloft for twenty-four hours or more.  Once the military
can refuel drones in midair—a development already on the hori-
zon22—they should be able to stay aloft indefinitely, reducing if not
eliminating temporal gaps in surveillance coverage.23
Military UAVs offer a number of other advantages over manned
aircraft: Pilot combat risk is eliminated.  In a traditional piloted mis-
sion, if the aircraft is destroyed, the crew may be killed or captured.24
On the other hand, if a drone is shot down, the operator remains safe
at the base, which may be thousands of miles away.25
The purchase price of a combat UAV is a fraction of that of a fighter
plane or bomber.   The most expensive armed U.S. drone is the MQ-9
Reaper, which cost about $12.5 million apiece in 2012.26  By compari-
son, the F-22 Raptor, a stealth fighter, cost more than $145 million
21. See Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force,
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 653 (2009); Lucy Kinder, US
Navy to Get a Drone the Size of a Boeing 757 Plane, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 8, 2014, 11:30
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10558105/US-
Navy-to-get-a-drone-the-size-of-a-Boeing-757-plane.html.
22. See, e.g., David Axe, Refueling Gear Makes Navy’s Next Drone Even Deadlier,
WIRED MAG. (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/navy-killer-
drone-refuel/ (discussing the Navy’s planned development of an aircraft carrier-
launched drone with midair refueling capability); Unstaffed drone refueling test “suc-
cessful,” BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19871063.
23. UAVs have already solved the other limiting factor (pilot fatigue) with regard
to the duration of flight missions, since the remote pilot can step away from the con-
trols and be relieved by a fresh pilot.
24. FRANCIS GARY POWERS WITH CRAIG GENTRY, OPERATION OVERFLIGHT:
THE U-2 SPY PILOT TELLS HIS STORY FOR THE FIRST TIME 78–84 (1970) (describing
the story of Gary Powers, one of the more famous American pilots who have been
captured after their planes were shot down, who flew the famous U-2 spy plane over
the Soviet Union in 1960; see also MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS, MAY-DAY: EISENHOWER,
KHRUSCHEV AND THE U-2 AFFAIR 25 (1986); JOHN MCCAIN & MARK SALTER, FAITH
OF MY FATHERS (1999) (detailing the six years that Senator McCain spent as a pris-
oner of war during the Vietnam War); Thom Shanker, U.S. Pilot’s Remains Found in
Iraq After 18 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/08/03/world/middleeast/03speicher.html?_r=0 (reporting on Michael Scott
Speicher, a naval pilot shot down at the beginning of the First Gulf War and who was
missing in action until his remains were found eighteen years later); SCOTT O’GRADY
& MICHAEL FRENCH, BASHER FIVE-TWO: THE TRUE STORY OF F-16 FIGHTER PILOT
SCOTT O’GRADY (1997) (writing about Scott O’Grady, who was shot down over Bos-
nia but escaped capture).
25. See Elisabeth Bumiller, A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot a World Away, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1.
26. See Drones, TIME MAG. (Nov. 6, 2012), available at http://nation.time.com/
2012/11/06/12548710-60.
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each in 2010.27  This is not to say that the Reaper and the Raptor are
directly interchangeable in terms of combat functions but merely to
illustrate the vast difference in acquisition cost.
Finally, in theory, an armed drone should be able to carry out at-
tacks in ways that further the two key principles of the laws of war:
distinction and proportionality.  Distinction is the obligation of a mili-
tary belligerent to attack legitimate military targets.28  An intentional
attack against a nonmilitary target, such as a group of civilians, a hos-
pital, or a historic building, may constitute a war crime.29  Note that a
lawful attack may well result in expected civilian casualties (euphemis-
tically known as “collateral damage”), so long as the intent of the at-
tack was to strike a military target.  Proportionality is the doctrine that
limits attacks to ones where the expected military advantage is reason-
able in relation to the expected nonmilitary harm.30  As we shall see,
none of these advantages is unique to American military use of
drones.
B. Legal Views on the Use of Weaponized Drones
Since the 2002 Yemen strike, drones have drawn considerable atten-
tion from government leaders, policymakers, and academics (mostly
critical),31 almost entirely focusing on American use of drones against
suspected terrorists and militants.  Early on, many international law
advocates and human rights lawyers argued that such drone strikes
were unlawful assassinations.32  International law expert Mary Ellen
O’Connell offered a more measured criticism, agreeing that battlefield
use of drone strikes did not per se violate the law of war but contend-
ing that the Yemen strike was unlawful because it supplanted the role
of law enforcement.33  Later, former Yale Law School Dean Harold
Koh, an international law expert then serving as the legal adviser to
the State Department, gave a speech before the American Society of
International Law in which he stated:
27. U.S. AIR FORCE, FY 2011 BUDGET ESTIMATES (Feb. 2010), available at http://
www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100128-072.pdf.
28. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Propriety of Self-Defense Targetings of Members of al
Qaeda and Applicable Principles of Distinction and Proportionality, 18 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 565, 577–79 (2012).
29. See id. at 577.
30. Id. at 578.
31. Contra see Kenneth Anderson, The Case for Drones, COMMENT. MAG., at 14
(June 2013); Jenks, supra note 21, at 665–70.
32. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2005) (col-
lecting sources).
33. See Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs, Comm. on Over-
sight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 18 (2010) (testimony of Mary Ellen O’Connell),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg64922/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg64922.pdf.
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[S]ome have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems,
such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations.  But the
rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon sys-
tem used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed con-
flict—such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as
they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war.  In-
deed, using such advanced technologies can ensure both that the
best intelligence is available for planning operations, and that civil-
ian casualties are minimized in carrying out such operations.34
Prior to serving in the Obama Administration, Koh had been a vocal
critic of the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism policies, once
calling the so-called torture memo “a stain on our national reputa-
tion.”35  Therefore, Koh’s defense of military drone strikes was an im-
portant step toward wearing away opposition to drone strikes.
By 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary, or arbitrary executions (Christof Heyns) conceded that
drones “are not illegal weapons” but did express concern that they
made it easier for nations to use lethal force.36  A year later, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (Ben Emmer-
son), however, produced a report that seemingly accepted the legality
of UAVs as a matter of principle, instead urging nations using them to
comply with international law (particularly the law of war require-
ments of distinction and proportionality) and to investigate thor-
oughly the causes and circumstances of civilian casualties inflicted in
UAV strikes.37  International and human rights lawyers have thus
seemingly shifted toward the predominant American view that an
armed drone is simply another weapons platform, the legality of which
is determined by the manner of its use.38
34. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
35. Paul Richter, Human Rights Advocate Named State Department’s Top Lawyer,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/25/nation
/na-justice-koh25. The “torture memo” was a legal opinion produced by the Office of
Legal Counsel that provided a controversial interpretation of the legal elements of
“torture” as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012). See Office of Legal Counsel,
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf.
36. U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbi-
trary executions, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013).
37. U.N. G.A. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/25/29 (Mar. 11, 2014).
38. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (“the
rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system used, and there
is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weap-
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Another popular area of legal analysis of the military use of drones
concerns the standards and oversight over the placement of targets on
what might best be described as the “kill list.”39  Just as the focus on
UAVs as technological weapons is effectively a challenge to a more
precise and efficient form of attack compared to a manned aircraft,
the focus on the kill list is less about drones and more about targeted
killing (though, of course, drone attacks are a primary method for kill-
ing a specified target).
Notwithstanding the emphasis on attack drones and targeted killing,
there have also been articles examining potential tort and civil liability
issues arising out of drone crashes, accidents, trespass, and other mis-
haps.40  Finally, with the likelihood of local governments using drones
for surveillance and other public functions, including law enforce-
ment, a spate of scholarship has focused on the privacy issues public
drones raise.41
C. Game of Drones: Terrorism Advantages of Drones
Just as American military use of weaponized UAVs is a difference
in degree, rather than kind, from the use of manned attack planes,
terrorist use of drones is simply the next step in the use of aerial vehi-
cles.  Put another way, drones may offer some advantages over
ons systems in armed conflict . . . so long as they are employed in conformity with
applicable laws of war.”).
39. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony Romero, Exec. Director, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, to President Barack Obama, Apr. 28, 2010, at 2 (expressing concern over,
among other things, “kill lists” containing targets designated for killing); Rise of the
Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Nat’l Sec. & Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, 111th Cong. 43 (2010) (testimony of William C. Banks urging Congress to
“revisit the AUMF . . . and provide a more fine-grained authorization for the use of
military force against terrorists”); Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a
Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Afsheen John Radsan & Richard W. Murphy, Due
Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 411 (2009) (ar-
guing for independent Executive Branch review of every targeted killing carried out
by the CIA); William Funk, Deadly Drones, Due Process, and the Fourth Amendment,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 311, 312 (2013).
40. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability
Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial
Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623 (2009) (discussing “worst-case scenarios” involving po-
lice drones).
41. See Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—or Will He? Consti-
tutional, Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 679–84 (2009); John Villasenor,
Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 457, 475–98 (2013); Brandon Nagy, Why They Can Watch You: Assessing
the Constitutionality of Warrantless Unmanned Aerial Surveillance by Law Enforce-
ment, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 135 (2014); Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming!:
Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1279 (2013).
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manned aircraft, but there is little that terrorists would be able to
achieve using drones that they would not be able to achieve using reg-
ular planes.  Indeed, in 2010, a man named Joseph Stack deliberately
crashed his single-engine small plane into a building housing his tar-
get, the Austin, Texas, office of the Internal Revenue Service, killing
himself and an IRS agent; thirteen other people were injured.42  There
were also unconfirmed reports that some of the 9/11 hijackers had
looked into the possibility of using small planes such as crop dusters to
serve as the delivery vehicle for chemical or biological weapons.43
Nevertheless, just as the U.S. military has been deliberately shifting
toward increased use of UAVs compared to manned aircraft,44 due to
the advantages drones offer, we might reasonably expect terrorists
contemplating aerial vehicle-based attacks to gravitate toward drones
as well.
1. Delivering Terror-Inducing Payloads—Recent literature on ter-
rorist plots within the United States has often focused on the so-called
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, or radio-
logical attacks),45 but terror attacks, successful or not, in the last two
decades or so have tended to involve bombs, most often delivered by
trucks.46  The devastation inflicted by the 9/11 attacks highlighted the
42. Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane Into Texas I.R.S. Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html.
43. See, e.g., Hijacker Visited Crop-Duster Airfield, ABC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2001),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92436; Richard A. Muller, Cropduster Terrorism:
What Terrorist Weapon is More Destructive than TNT and More Available than
Nukes? It’s Gasoline, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 11, 2002), http://www.technologyreview
.com/news/401388/cropduster-terrorism/ (“An Air Tractor 502 Crop Duster airplane is
far smaller than a 767, but it is also a flying tanker. . . . Fill ‘er up with 1,700 liters of
gasoline, and you are carrying roughly 2.1 to 2.4 tons, the energy equivalent of 32 to
36 tons of TNT.”). But see Edward Jay Epstein, Fictoid #11: The Terror Crop Dusters,
NETHERWORLD, http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/nether_fictoid11.htm (last visited
Dec. 24, 2015) (noting that the crop duster story relied on two eyewitnesses, each of
whom claimed to have met 9/11 hijackers at times when they were demonstrably
known to have been outside the U.S.).
44. A few years ago, the Air Force began to recruit more pilots for UAVs than for
manned aircraft. See Michael Evans, Drones to Eclipse Crewed Aircraft, AUSTRA-
LIAN, Aug. 3, 2012, at 10; see also Drone Pilots: Dilbert at War, ECONOMIST, June 21,
2014, at 68, available at http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21604608-stress-
ful-lives-chair-force-dilbert-war (noting “that the air force is training more drone pi-
lots than fighter and bomber pilots combined”).  In that same year, UAVs flew more
combat hours than manned aircraft did. See Jim Michaels, Drones change “Top Gun”
Culture of Air Force, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/.
45. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES’ HEEL: NU-
CLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK (1998). But
see JOHN MUELLER, ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM FROM HIROSHIMA TO
AL-QAEDA (2009) (arguing that nuclear weapons are too unwieldy to serve as an ef-
fective instrument of terror, compared to the ease with which fanatics can kill using
conventional explosives).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding the
case of one of the most violent truck bomb attacks in the United States, the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, which killed six people and injured over a thousand);
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tactical value of aircraft as instruments of terror and not just targets, a
trend which continued afterward.47  Most recently, in 2011, a twenty-
six-year-old man named Rezwan Ferdaus pleaded guilty to trying to
attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol building with remote-con-
trolled planes filled with explosives; he was caught as a result of a
sting operation where undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents fooled him into believing that they were al Qaeda members.48
Truck or car bombs will probably continue to fascinate would-be
terrorists as vehicles for destruction, but they have their limitations
when it comes to attacking hardened targets.  Following the
Oklahoma City bombing, many federal courthouses and buildings
placed heavy concrete barriers to keep cars and other vehicles a cer-
tain distance away.  Still, a large enough truck bomb can cause dam-
age to buildings several blocks away,49 so physical barriers cannot
ensure the safety of the target;50 and of course there are many more
see also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) (deciding a
case of the truck bomb attack on Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which
killed 168 people).  Similar attacks against American targets in foreign countries in-
clude the simultaneous bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
the destruction of the Khobar Towers residential complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in
1996, and the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983. See
STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND
BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 138, 403–04 (2004);
GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE AGE OF
GLOBAL TERROR 201–02 (2011).  Truck bombs continue to fascinate those who enter-
tain drams of terrorism against American targets, as demonstrated by a number of
successful post-9/11 undercover sting operations that have resulted in convictions for
attempted truck bomb attacks. For a discussion of some of these stings and a highly
critical review of government tactics involved, see TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR
FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM (2013).
47. In 2006, London authorities foiled a plot by homegrown British terrorists to
smuggle improvised liquid explosives on to trans-Atlantic passenger jetliners. See Don
Van Natta, Jr., et al., Details Emerge in British Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/28/world/europe/28plot.html?pagewanted=all.
48. See Jess Bidgood, Massachusetts Man Gets 17 Years in Terrorist Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2012, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/us/
rezwan-ferdaus-of-massachusetts-gets-17-years-in-terrorist-plot.html.
49. LOU MICHEL & DAN HERBECK, AMERICAN TERRORIST: TIMOTHY MCVEIGH
AND THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 231 (2001) (reporting that the truck bomb that
Timothy McVeigh set off in Oklahoma City damaged “[e]very one of the structures in
a sixteen-block area . . . some of which so badly they would have to be demolished.”
Four of the 167 blast victims were elsewhere than the doomed federal building. Id. at
233–34.
50. Note that after the truck bombing attacks against the World Trade Center in
1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, security personnel
at likely terrorism targets should be attuned to the possible dangers posed by large
trucks.  Even vigilant security personnel would have difficulty thwarting a suicide at-
tack.  Consider, as an example, the devastating 1983 truck bombing attack against the
U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon.  Despite the presence of armed guards, barbed
wiring, and concrete barriers, the driver was able to plow his explosive-filled vehicle
into the barracks, killing 241 people. See PETER HUCHTHAUSEN, AMERICA’S
SPLENDID LITTLE WARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS:
1975–2000 59 (2001).
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soft targets such as shopping malls, skyscrapers, schools, and other
such locations that remain vulnerable to ground vehicle-based at-
tacks.51  For some attractive terrorism targets, drones will offer an av-
enue of attack that ground vehicles cannot.
2. Minimizing the Risk of Capture—A second important advantage
of drones compared to manned aircraft is the reduction if not elimina-
tion of risk to pilots.  As noted above, piloted aircraft are capable of
carrying out the same kinds of attacks that drones can.  However, the
pilot faces a substantial risk of being shot down or captured, possible
outcomes that may deter a would-be terrorist (assuming that the pilot
is not embarking on a suicide mission).  A drone operator, on the
other hand, stands a much better chance of evading capture even if
the UAV is shot down for the obvious reason that the operator is
physically located somewhere other than in the aircraft.
The maximum distance that a drone operator can maintain control
over a UAV depends on the method of communication between drone
and controller and the controller’s power output.  Commercially avail-
able drones in the United States have operating ranges of anywhere
from 300 to 900 feet or more.52  For terrorism purposes, 900 feet is
probably not sufficient range because it is less than a single lap around
a standard track.  On the other hand, over a decade ago, a retired
engineer and “pioneer in developing unmanned aerial vehicles . . . for
the military” built a small remote-controlled plane weighing less than
eleven pounds that flew across the Atlantic Ocean; the flight lasted
almost thirty-nine hours and yet used less than a gallon of gasoline53—
proving that longer range control of non-military drones is possible.
Moreover, this question of control range is relevant only if the oper-
ator wants to maintain active control over the drone.  If the pilot has
instead designed the drone to be controlled by a preinstalled flight
program, then once the drone has been launched it no longer needs to
be within any means of communication with the would-be terrorist.54
Used in such a manner, a programmed drone would be the functional
equivalent of a guided missile.
51. See, e.g., Tom LaTourrette et al., Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Cen-
ters: An Analysis of Potential Security Options, RAND CORP., http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR401.pdf.
52. Phantom 2 Vision, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision/spec (in-
forming that with its optional range extender, DJI’s popular “Phantom 2 Vision” can
be controlled via wifi at a distance up to 900 feet).
53. See Emma Brown, Maynard Hill; Built Model Airplane That Flew Across At-
lantic, WASH. POST (June 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/
model-airplane-history-maker-maynard-hill-dies-at-the-age-of-85/2011/06/08/AGcny
QNH_story.html; see also Model Plane Goes Transatlantic, BBC NEWS (Aug. 12,
2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3145577.stm.
54. One software company is already selling an open source package for an
“autopilot platform” for drones. See Home Page, OPEN PILOT, https://www.openpilot.
org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
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3. Reducing the Cost of Terror Attacks—A final advantage of
drones over manned aircraft is a much lower cost:  A small drone can
be purchased or built for a fraction of the $1 million or more that a
small manned plane would cost.  Even for a multinational terrorist
group such as al Qaeda, which provided the estimated
$400,000–$500,000 for the 9/11 operation,55 finances are a relevant
consideration; by 2005, al Qaeda was already reportedly running short
on donations.56  One reason may be the success of U.S. efforts to re-
strict money flows to terrorist groups through material-support-prohi-
bition statutes, which make it federal crimes to provide, among other
things, money to assist an act of terrorism or to a designated foreign
terrorist organization.57
The cheaper cost of an aerial attack using a drone as compared to a
manned aircraft is likely to be an even more important consideration
for individuals or small groups.  Recent concerns about domestic ter-
rorism attempts have included significant focus on lone wolves or iso-
lated groups,58 as demonstrated by the number of undercover sting
operations since 9/11 in which the federal government has arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted individuals for attempted terrorist
attacks.59
55. See 9/11 COMM’N REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 COMM’N 169 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter 9/11 COMM’N REPORT].
56. See, e.g., Rajeh Said, Al Qaeda’s funding sources drying up, AL-SHORFA (Jan.
23, 2012), http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2012/01/23/feature-
01.
57. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (2012).
58. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SIMON, LONE WOLF TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE
GROWING THREAT 23 (2013); Joint Intelligence Bulletin, Use of Small Arms: Examin-
ing Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics, HOMELAND SEC. & FED. BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION, Aug. 16, 2011, at 2 (2013), https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-FBI-
WestgateMallAttack.pdf (“Attacks by lone offenders—which by definition lack co-
conspirators, and therefore provide fewer opportunities for detection—may be more
difficult for law enforcement and homeland security authorities to disrupt.”).
59. Civil libertarian critics have disputed the true extent of the threat posed by
such persons, arguing that the FBI has either entrapped gullible defendants or other-
wise manufactured fantastical plots that were far beyond the capabilities of the
targets. See, e.g., AARONSON, supra note 46; Glenn Greenwald, The FBI Again
Thwarts Its Own Terror Plot: Are There so Few Actual Terrorists That the FBI Has to
Recruit Them into Manufactured Attacks?, SALON (Sept. 29, 2011, 1:30 PM), available
at http://www.salon.com/2011/09/29/fbi_terror/.  However, while many of the defend-
ants in these sting cases have raised entrapment, either formally as a legal defense in
court or informally as a talking point in the press, as of late 2014, not a single defen-
dant has prevailed. See Karen Greenberg, How Terrorist ‘Entrapment’ Ensnares us
All, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/how-terrorist-entrapment-ensares-us-all; see also Thomas




(quoting FBI Director Mueller as saying, “There has not been yet to my knowledge a
defendant who has been acquitted in asserting the entrapment defense”).  Since 2011,
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4. Potential Advances in Drone Technology—Even if drone terror-
ism does not pose a significant threat today, drone technology will
improve along predictable dimensions: greater carrying capacity, in-
creased duration of flight time, and more precise flying.  The develop-
ment of autonomous control over a drone—or even a swarm of
drones60—will be as much of a boon for would-be terrorists as for
legitimate drone operators.  One small drone may be difficult enough
to stop; stopping every single one of a dozen or more will be a Hercu-
lean task.
III. REGULATION OF DRONES
Congress began setting the framework for regulating large-scale use
of private drones in U.S. airspace when it passed the FAA Moderniza-
tion and Reform Act of 2012, Title III, Subtitle B of which addressed
“Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”61  Given the novelty of UAVs, this law
unsurprisingly took a cautious approach.  Rather than lay down spe-
cific rules, Congress delegated to the Transportation Secretary and the
FAA the task of creating appropriate regulations to integrate drones
into the national airspace by 2015.
As a stopgap measure, the FAA continues to rely on Advisory Cir-
cular 91-57 (“AC 91-57”), a 1981 document setting general standards
for model aircraft,62 which are remotely piloted, noncommercial air-
craft weighing fifty-five pounds or less and operated within the pilot’s
line of sight.63  However, AC 91-57 provides only general guidance
such as to avoid flying over parks, churches, schools, and hospitals,
and to fly no higher than 400 feet above the ground.64
State laws can also regulate UAVs, either directly or indirectly.  A
number of states have enacted drone-specific legislation, typically
banning the arming of drones or using private drones to spy on other
individuals.65  Such state laws supplement, rather than replace, federal
laws and regulations; they can restrict legal drone operation more se-
one high-profile case in Portland, Oregon, resulted in a trial verdict of guilty, rejecting
the defendant’s entrapment defense. See Bryan Denson, Mohamed Mohamud Found
Guilty in Portland Terrorism Trial, OREGONIAN (Jan. 31, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://
www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/01/mohamed_mohamud_found_guilty_
i.html.
60. Jenks, supra note 21, at 653.
61. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 13
(2012).
62. MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS, DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. AVIA-
TION ADMIN. (June 9, 1981), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_
Circular/91-57.pdf.
63. See INTERPRETATION OF SPECIAL RULE FOR MODERN AIRCRAFT, DEP’T OF
TRANSP. FED. AVIATION ADMIN. No. FAA-2014-0396, at 6 (June 18, 2014), available
at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf.
64. MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS, supra note 62, § 3.a, c.
65. See A. Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and
Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1, § III.B (2015).
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verely than what the FAA does but cannot authorize what the FAA
forbids.66  In addition, even non-drone-specific state laws can regulate
the conduct of drone operators indirectly.  Examples include torts
such as trespass, invasion of privacy, and nuisance.67  Similarly, there
need not be a specific drone-related criminal statute on the books in
order to prosecute a drone operator who commits a crime using a
drone, any more than there needs to be a terrorism-specific statute to
punish a perpetrator for an act that could be described as terrorism.68
Given the potential for drones to carry out acts of terror within the
United States, one might wonder whether Congress or the states
should simply enact legislation to prohibit private or commercial own-
ership or use of drones.  This would be a reversal of the direction of
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act and perhaps therefore quite
unlikely to occur,69 although individual jurisdictions have exhibited
varying degrees of skepticism toward local use of drones.70
There would be clear antiterrorism benefits from such a ban.  First,
there would be many fewer drones in the skies to worry about.  Even
though nearly all (or all) of the reduction in drone traffic would be
expected to come from law-abiding persons, the net result would be
fewer potential unidentified aerial targets.  Government officials
charged with defending against drone attacks therefore would have
more time to analyze any potential threat that happened to be de-
tected.  Second, drones in the air not under government control would
draw quick suspicion, as would any person seemingly operating a
66. Congress could preempt state laws on drones, even ones that do not expressly
conflict with federal laws, through so-called field preemption, which occurs where the
federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to “occupy the field.” See Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Loge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Areospace
Eng’rs v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140–48 (1976).
67. See Froomkin & Coangelo, supra note 65, § II.
68. See, e.g., Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White
Terrorists? Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 33, 45–46, 53–54 (2013) (discussing how Oregon, lacking a terrorism statute,
convicted a father-son duo of aggravated murder for placing a bomb that eventually
killed two police officers).
69. Indeed, it is also worth asking whether a potentially useful technology should
be banned merely because it could be misused to perpetuate a terrorism incident.
Trucks and fertilizer, for example, are societally useful objects that nevertheless can
be turned into truck bombs, yet it would be difficult to imagine that the government
would respond to the threat of another Oklahoma City-style attack by banning either.
The benefits of such a ban—a minute reduction in the expected damage from the next
truck bomb attack—would be vastly outweighed by the costs—(significant reduction
in agricultural yield and/or a massive drag on the national economy due to the slow-
down in transportation of goods).  Admittedly, the utility of private drones is at pre-
sent largely confined to entertainment and hobbies, and a detailed accounting of the
potential utilities is beyond the scope of this Article.
70. For example, the city of Seattle shelved plans to use drones for law enforce-
ment purposes after significant opposition from local residents. See Christine Clar-
ridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013, 9:34
PM), available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddrones
xml.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL405.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-MAR-16 10:35
2015] DEFENDING AGAINST DRONE TERRORISM 649
drone remotely.  The likelihood of a false positive (i.e., misidentifying
an innocuous drone as a hostile one) versus a false negative (i.e., mis-
identifying a hostile drone as an innocuous one) would shift heavily
toward the latter, which would probably lead to more decisive anti-
drone action.
On the other hand, a ban on private or commercial drones would
only simplify the problems of identification.  It would not make it eas-
ier to detect potentially hostile drones. A legal prohibition on a dual-
use item such as a drone will not eliminate the actual possession of
private drones within the United States.  Consider handguns and nu-
clear weapons.  Federal law bars convicted felons from possessing fire-
arms,71 while nuclear weapons are, of course, off-limits to all
individuals.  Yet, the federal prohibition of possession of firearms by
convicted felons does not physically prevent a felon from getting a
hold of guns.72  The reason terrorists and criminals do not have ready
access to nuclear weapons is that they are incredibly difficult to manu-
facture, particularly the necessary fissile material,73 which represents a
physical restriction.
There would be fewer drones available to be commandeered for
criminal purposes, but even without commercial manufacturing of
drones within the United States, a would-be terrorist could still ac-
quire a drone in various ways:
1. Stealing one from a public agency—It seems surprisingly easy to
steal police vehicles and equipment.74  Presumably, a police UAV
would be secured better (as many of the stolen police car incidents
involve vehicles left with the keys in the ignition), but it would be a
tempting target.  Extending a prohibition on UAVs to public agencies
to avoid this problem would further reduce the supply available to be
stolen, but it would also deprive society of the public benefits of
search and rescue, firefighting, or law enforcement drones.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
72. One need only peruse the number of Section 922(g) convictions to see that
numerous felons are indeed able to get their hands on guns. In 2012, there were 4,190
convictions for violating Section 922(g). See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Overview of
Federal Criminal Cases: Fiscal Year 2012, 9, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2013/FY12_Overview_Federal_Crim
inal_Cases.pdf.
73. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 45, at 169–72.
74. See, e.g., Five charged With Breaking Into Dothan Police Vehicle,
DOTHANEAGLE (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.dothaneagle.com/news/crime_
court/article_027a3950-6641-11e2-9103-001a4bcf6878.html (reporting theft of tactical
police equipment from police car); Wendy Lin, Highway Robbery: Police Car Stolen,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 13, 1993, at 16 (“A police car was stolen yesterday from two police
officers who were investigating a report of a stolen car in Brooklyn”); Teen arrested
for stealing police chief’s car, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 10, 2005 (reporting that a teen-
ager stole the Conover Police Chief’s “unmarked patrol car”).
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2. Smuggling it from outside the country—UAVs could be brought
across the U.S.-Canada or U.S.-Mexico borders in regular vehicles;75
interdiction would possibly require searching every vehicle at a border
stop.
3. Building one—Building one’s own drone is already a popular
hobby; as one example, see DIY Drones, a community website de-
voted to helping amateurs build their own drones for under $1,000.76
Once the drone has been built, weaponizing it is not challenging.77
In short, while small UAVs are nowhere (yet) as ubiquitous in the
United States as handguns are, we would still have to prepare our-
selves to detect, identify, and destroy any potentially hostile drones,
even if the federal or state governments were to ban private use of
them.  At most, such bans would simplify the challenges involved at
the identification stage but not at the detection or destruction stages.
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST DRONE ATTACKS: THREE CHALLENGES
Aerial drones offer an attractive vehicle for terrorism because they
can be smuggled into the country, assembled, and deployed without
having to fly into the country.  Unless we can interdict the drone
before it is smuggled in, we will need a way of detecting it in the air,
identifying it as potentially threatening, and taking action to stop it.
A. Detection
The initial step in responding to any potential terrorism threat
posed by a drone is to be able to detect it early enough to mount an
effective response.  Consider that a drone capable of carrying a small
package flying at an altitude of 400 feet with an air speed of thirty to
forty miles per hour will look “like a tiny dot moving in the sky” and
will be quiet enough that it cannot be heard.78  Of course, at some
75. See Villasenor, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that drones “can be transported in
the trunk of a car or in a backpack”).
76. See DIYDRONES, http://www.diydrones.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).
77. See, e.g., Adam Piore, How I Tried Turning My Off-The-Shelf Drone into a
Weapon: The Unregulated, Slightly Terrifying Frontier of Personal Flight, POPULAR
SCI. (July 11 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-06/flight-fringe
(describing the author’s experiment of packing his small commercial drone with
model rocket explosives).
78. See Alexis C. Madrigal, A Drone-Delivery Expert Answers the Big Questions
About Amazon’s Plans, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/tech-
nology/archive/2013/12/a-drone-delivery-expert-answers-the-big-questions-about-am-
azons-plans/281980/ (interview with founder of drone delivery company).  There are
private companies developing devices that they claim can detect drones—even ones
that are virtually invisible to radar.  Washington, D.C.-based DroneShield claims to be
able to detect small drones by their “acoustic signature.” See DRONESHIELD, http://
www.droneshield.org/products/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015).  This particular product/
service appears primarily aimed at detecting and interdicting surveillance and spy
drones from getting close enough to invade personal or corporate privacy.  The ex-
pected close proximity allows the detection of acoustic signatures.
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point unaided human senses can detect even small UAVs, but depend-
ing on the size of the vehicle, any intended attack may be mere min-
utes away.
As far as civilian air traffic control goes, the modern world relies
not on human spotters, but rather radar systems,79 after radar demon-
strated its usefulness in World War II.  A radar detector works by
sending a beam of energy outward in the direction it is searching.  If
the beam intersects an object, some of it will be absorbed, but the
remaining energy will scatter, including some back toward the radar.
Because the velocity (speed and direction) of the beam is a known
quantity, the distance from the detector to the object can be deter-
mined based on time elapsed from when the beam is emitted to when
the bounce-back energy is detected.80  The height of the detected ob-
ject can also be calculated through simple trigonometry, given the dis-
tance to the object and the angle between the ground and the energy
beam.81  Finally, the radar system can determine the radial velocity
(i.e., the speed of the object along the direct line to the radar) by
analyzing the Doppler shift in the return signal.82
The key challenge for the radar system is to determine whether any
detected bounce-back energy came from an actual target or from in-
terference (i.e., noise).  As one technical book explains, “[false alarm]
errors are minimized if the target spikes stand out strongly from the
background interference, i.e., if the SIR [signal-to-interference ratio]
is as large as possible.”83  The larger the target, the more radar energy
is reflected back and hence the stronger the target spike.  Due to their
size, small drones reflect less radar energy and present smaller signa-
tures; moreover, they can be constructed using composite materials
that absorb radar energy without reflecting it back toward the detec-
tor.  As a result, they can be virtually invisible to radar.84  The upshot
is that the problem of detecting potentially hostile drones is not likely
to be solved by building more active radar systems within the United
States.
79. Radar is an acronym for “radio detection and ranging.” See NAVAL AIR TECH-
NICAL TRAINING CENTER, FUNDAMENTALS OF RADAR 1 (1943); MARK A. RICHARDS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSING 1 (2005).
80. Madrigal, supra note 78, at 1; RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 3.  For example,
suppose that the beam travels at 600 miles per hour (approximately the speed of
sound at sea level), or 10 miles per minute.  If the bounce back energy is detected
after two minutes, then the object is 10 miles away; the radar beam took one minute
to reach the object, and then one minute to return to the detector.
81. RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 3.
82. Id.  The Doppler shift refers to the change in the frequency of an electromag-
netic wave due to the change in position between the source (i.e., the target of the
radar) and the observer (i.e., the radar).  The waves become more compressed as the
source moves toward the observer, and less compressed as the source moves away
from the observer.
83. Id. at 48.
84. See Villasenor, supra note 14, at 16.
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This type of radar system is sometimes referred to as primary radar
but in fact has assumed a backup role in domestic air traffic control.
So-called secondary surveillance, relying on transponders located on
the aircraft to broadcast flight-related information, has become the
main method of detecting and identifying airplanes in the air.85  The
weakness of transponders, at least on manned aircraft, is that those
intent on causing mischief or worse can refuse to comply.  For exam-
ple, after successfully taking control of the four doomed airplanes on
9/11, the al Qaeda hijackers turned the transponders off,86 making
tracking the aircraft a considerably more difficult task.  And of course
there is the problem of forcing the drone operators to install
transponders.
Another potential detection method is to keep surveillance UAVs
in the air on a continuous basis as spotters.  As noted earlier, one of
the major advantages that UAVs offer compared to manned flights is
vastly extended flight time.  But given the current technological diffi-
culties in detecting small drones via radar or other methods, it would
require multiple surveillance UAVs in all but the geographically small-
est metropolitan areas.  If a small drone at a distance of 400 feet looks
like a tiny dot in the sky, then the same drone would also look like a
tiny dot to a surveillance UAV flying at 800 feet.  One solution would
be to fly the surveillance UAV at a lower altitude, except that doing so
would limit the scope of coverage provided by the UAV, which might
require the operation of additional surveillance UAVs in the area.
Additionally, UAV surveillance is far from costless; the Department
of Homeland Security’s  inspector general estimated that each hour of
drone surveillance by U.S. Customs and Border Protection cost over
$12,000, due in part to the fact that the planes were frequently
grounded due to maintenance issues or absence of pilots.87
Even if surveillance UAVs prove to be technologically capable of
detecting potentially hostile drones, the government’s widespread use
of such spotting aircraft may raise Fourth Amendment issues.  Under
basic search and seizure doctrine, the government conducts a search
when it infringes upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.88  In California v. Ciraolo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
local law enforcement officers did not engage in a search by flying a
police plane at 1,000 feet in the air to see into the defendant’s backy-
ard full of marijuana plants because there could have been private and
commercial planes at that altitude and, hence, any expectation of pri-
85. See infra Part IV.B.
86. 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 55, at 16.
87. See Craig Whitlock, U.S. Surveillance Drones Largely Ineffective Along Bor-
der, Report Says, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-surveillance-drones-largely-ineffective-along-border-report-says/
2015/01/06/5243abea-95bc-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html.
88. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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vacy from overhead surveillance was unreasonable.89 Florida v. Riley
followed a few years later, upholding police discovery of marijuana
plants in a mostly covered greenhouse spotted only through the use of
a helicopter hovering at 400 feet.90  These cases would suggest
strongly that high-altitude aerial surveillance by government drones
would not violate any reasonable expectations of privacy.
Nonetheless, recent decisions from the Supreme Court hint at dis-
comfort with the implications of the Katz doctrine in today’s techno-
logical society.  In another line of cases that evolved from Katz, the
Court ruled that the use of devices to duplicate what police could have
gleaned through human observation did not constitute a search so
long as the human observations would have been valid.  Thus, the use
of a beeper to enable police to track the location of the device—and
hence the suspect—did not violate the Fourth Amendment.91  Under
these precedents, one would not have expected any Fourth Amend-
ment problems with the use of a global-positioning-satellite device to
follow the movements of a suspect’s vehicle.  Yet, in United States v.
Jones, all nine members of the Court agreed with the target of the
GPS surveillance that a search had occurred.92  As to why it was a
search, though, the Court split 5–4, with the slim majority ruling that
the FBI had committed a physical trespass by placing the GPS device
on Jones’s car without consent and without a valid warrant and that
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was an overlay on top
of the prior understanding that any physical intrusion constituted a
search.93  This trespass rationale enabled the majority to avoid decid-
ing whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s
public locations and movements.  The Justices in the minority would
have held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy against
“longer term GPS monitoring.”94
Jones suggests that the Court is not prepared just yet to reject the
long-accepted doctrinal view that whatever one knowingly and volun-
tarily exposes to the public is bereft of Fourth Amendment protection
89. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Court acknowledged that the defendant had taken steps to protect his privacy by
setting up tall fences, which blocked the view of the backyard from the street. Id. at
216.  But as Katz explained, a reasonable expectation privacy in one way is not neces-
sarily a reasonable expectation of privacy in another way. Id. at 211–12 (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
90. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989).
91. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); see also United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719–21 (1984) (finding  that the beeper placed inside a container
of ether did provide police with information they could not have obtained through
mere visual observation because the vehicle carrying the container drove into the
garage of a home and later left; without the beeper, the police would not have known
whether the container remained with the vehicle or had been unloaded in the
building).
92. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
93. Id. at 950 (discussing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
94. Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
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no matter what technology the government uses to ease its means of
observation.95  Otherwise, Justice Alito’s concurrence would have
been the majority opinion.  But at the same time, the  Court did not
blindly apply the voluntary exposure doctrine; had it done so, it would
have upheld the GPS tracking in Jones as a more technologically ad-
vanced version of the beeper tracker used in United States v. Knotts.
The trespass formulation of the search in essence allowed the Court to
put off deciding the more difficult question of when government use
of technology to follow public movements cross the line from being
merely helpful to being unduly oppressive.96
B. Identification
As explained above, active (or primary) radar systems can provide
the location and velocity of an object in the sky but typically cannot
identify the object.97  Thus, an increase in the effective radar coverage
or surveillance of urban regions will not be enough to address drone
terrorism without a corresponding increase in the ability to ascertain
the nature of those detected objects.  The need for identification will
only intensify in the next few years as American airspace becomes
more and more crowded with non-military drones.
Identification of any specific aircraft, at present, relies upon an on-
board transponder that broadcasts a coded signal, which in turn is re-
ceived and decoded by air traffic control towers.  This is equivalent to
the “identification of friend or foe” (“IFF”) codes used by U.S. mili-
tary aircraft to avoid targeting friendly aircraft.  The transponder
broadcast has a number of advantages over active radar.  It contains
much more information than the radar can provide, including the
identity of the aircraft and more accurate altitude, bearing, and posi-
tional information.
95. The Court used a similar rationale in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013), to hold that police officers engaged in a search when they brought a drug-
sniffing dog on to the porch of a suspect’s home.  As with Jones, the majority did not
rely on Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy test, but rather the trespass
theory of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1416 (“But introducing a trained police dog
to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is
something else. There is no customary invitation to do that.”).
96. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67 (2012) (contending that the Court revived a test that never
existed); Jim Harper, Escaping Fourth Amendment Doctrine After Jones: Physics,
Law, and Privacy Protection, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 219, 219 (2011–12) (“Jones . . .
has put Fourth Amendment law into a state of flux”). Cf. Jack Gillum et al., FBI flying
spy aircraft over cities, OREGONIAN (AP), June 3, 2015, at A14 (revealing the exis-
tence of manned aerial surveillance flights by the FBI and other federal law enforce-
ment agencies).
97. RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 45–47 (explaining that through the use of sophis-
ticated “synthetic aperture radar technique[s],” some modern radar systems are able
to generate visual images; however, these are “most commonly associated with mov-
ing airborne or space-based radars, rather than with fixed ground-based radars.”).
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As a result, Congress directed the FAA to issue, by the end of 1990,
regulations requiring the installation of transponders in all aircraft in
domestic airspace “where radar service is provided for separation of
aircraft.”98  The FAA did so, imposing a requirement of working tran-
sponders in any aircraft flying above 18,000 feet, anywhere from sur-
face level to 10,000 feet near major airports, or anywhere from surface
level to 4,000 feet near smaller airports.99
C. Destruction or Disablement
Once a UAV has been detected and identified as potentially hostile,
all that remains is to neutralize it.  Drones can be shot down, they can
have their guidance systems damaged, or their control signals can be
jammed or interfered with.  Various drones across the world, Ameri-
can or foreign, have already been attacked, sometimes successfully:
• December 2002:  An Iraqi fighter plane engaged an armed
Predator drone in an aerial dogfight; the drone launched its anti-
air missile but missed, while the jet fighter’s missile destroyed
the drone.100
• April 2008:  A fighter plane (suspected of being Russian) shot
down a Georgian drone in 2008 using an air-to-air missile.101
• September 2009:  U.S. military pilots shot down an unresponsive
American combat drone in Afghanistan.102
• December 2011:  Iranian officials claimed to have been responsi-
ble for shooting down a U.S. surveillance drone that crashed.103
• November 2012:  Two Iranian fighter planes fired at an Ameri-
can drone with thirty-millimeter cannons but failed to shoot it
down.104
98. 49 U.S.C. § 44716(f) (2012).
99. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.215(b) (2014).  For definitions of Class A, B, and C air-
space, see INSTRUMENT FLYING HANDBOOK, DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN. 1–2 (2012), http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation
/media/FAA-H-8083-15B.pdf.
100. See RICHARD WHITTLE, PREDATOR: THE SECRET ORIGINS OF THE DRONE
REVOLUTION 308 (2014); David Axe, Predator Drones Once Shot Back at Jets . . . But
Sucked at It, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 9, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/
predator-defenseless/.  At one point, the video footage from the Predator drone was
available on YouTube, but it has since been designated “private.”
101. Russia “Shot Down Georgia Drone,” BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2008, 7:51 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7358761.stm (providing a video footage from the
drone).
102. Jeremy Hsu, Air Force Shoots Down Runaway Drone Over Afghanistan, POP.
SCIENCE (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/
2009-09/when-drones-go-wild-air-force-shoots-them-down.
103. Iran Claims it Shot Down U.S. Drone, MCCLATCHY-TRIBUNE NEWS SERV.
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.boulderweekly.com/article-7062-iran-claims-it-shot-down-
us-drone.html.
104. Spencer Ackerman, Iranian Pilots Tried (and Failed) to Shoot Down a U.S.
Drone, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/iran-
drone/.
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• December 2013:  Chinese air force pilots reportedly shot down a
private drone that was interfering with commercial planes.105
Besides air-to-air missiles and gunfire, lasers may be an effective
weapon against drones.  The U.S. Navy has been developing a ship-
based laser cannon for use against drones and other small targets;106 in
test trials in 2010 and 2012, such laser systems successfully shot down
several UAVs by setting them on fire.107  Although the naval laser is
still in the test phase, the Navy is moving forward with a similar, port-
able ground-based laser system.108
Other forms of electromagnetic attack consist of interfering with
the GPS signals that the drone uses to position itself.  Successful jam-
ming of GPS signals would leave the drone unable to follow the pilot’s
navigation commands accurately, while successful “spoofing” could
enable an attacker to take control of the drone.109  Russian and Ira-
nian operators have claimed to have brought down U.S. drones in
such a fashion, although the veracity of such claims is questionable.110
1. Military use—At present, air-to-air missiles, weaponized lasers,
aircraft-mounted thirty-millimeter cannons, and, to some extent, elec-
tronic jammers are military equipment that generally would not be
found in the armory of local police departments.  To the extent that
they are the kinds of equipment required to destroy or disable UAVs,
the most obvious logistical approach would have the military carry out
any necessary anti-drone operations.
105. See Drone Shot Down in Beijing Suburb, Operators Charged, CHINA DAILY
(Dec. 16, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-12/16/content_19
099308.htm.
106. All Systems Go: Navy’s Laser Weapon Ready for Summer Deployment, U.S.
Navy, OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (Apr. 7, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://www.navy.mil/
submit/display.asp?story_id=80172.
107. See Spencer Ackerman, Watch the Navy’s New Ship-Mounted Laser Cannon
Kill a Drone, WIRED MAG. (Apr. 8, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/
laser-warfare-system/; Larry Greenemeier, U.S. Navy Laser Weapon Shoots Down
Drones in Test [Video], SCIENTIFIC AM. (July 19, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/laser-downs-uavs/ (includes video footage).
108. Rosa Prince, US Military Announces Laser Weapon to Shoot Down Enemy
Drones: Ground-Based Air Defence System Described by US as ‘Dad News for the
Bad Guys,’ TELEGRAPH (June 16, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/10861780/US-military-announces-laser-weapon-to-shoot-down-ene
my-drones.html.
109. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIR-
CRAFT SYSTEMS: MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY
CONCERNS WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYS-
TEM 36–37 (2012).  In 2012, scholar Ben Wittes of the Brookings Institute organized a
simulated aerial dogfight using small UAVs, in which he prevailed by hacking the
other drones to take them over. See Benjamin Wittes, The Lawfare Drone
Smackdown, BROOKINGS (Sept. 24, 2012, 5:38 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
up-front/posts/2012/09/24-drone-smackdown-wittes.
110. See, e.g., Connor Simpson, Russia Says It Took Down a U.S. Drone Over Cri-
mea, WIRE (Mar. 14, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.thewire.com/global/2014/03/russia-
claims-it-took-down-us-drone/359197/.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL405.txt unknown Seq: 23 11-MAR-16 10:35
2015] DEFENDING AGAINST DRONE TERRORISM 657
Use of military forces on domestic soil inevitably raises statutory
concerns under the Posse Comitatus Act,111 which states:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part
of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.112
Although the text of the statute mentions only the Army and Air
Force, the Department of the Navy has consistently considered the
Navy and the Marines to be similarly bound by the Posse Comitatus
Act.113  In addition, Title 10 of the United States Code, whose subject
matter is the military, includes a provision stating that:
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any
equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel)
under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by
a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a
search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation
in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.114
To be sure, these two statutes do not prohibit the U.S. military from
taking any combat role on U.S. soil.  The key restriction is on having
the military engage in law enforcement activities, such as searches,
seizures, and arrests.115  Over a number of years, especially since the
9/11 attacks, Congress has enacted provisions suggesting that military
combat-related actions do not constitute law enforcement.  The
Homeland Security Act of 2002, for example, contains sections mak-
ing clear that the newly created Department of Homeland Security
was to have no military role and that nothing about the creation of
that department was intended to take away the role of the military in
“warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other mili-
111. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Wider Military Role in U.S. is Urged, N.Y. TIMES (July
21, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/us/wider-military-role-in-us-is-
urged.html (“Administration lawyers determined that President Bush would violate
Posse Comitatus if he called up National Guard troops to help provide security at
airports nationwide.”).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).  Enacted after the post-Civil War Reconstruction pe-
riod, the Posse Comitatus Act was aimed at keeping the federal government from
using the military to interfere with or supervise the newly-installed civilian govern-
ments in the South. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir.
1986); NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 746 (4th
ed. 2012).
113. See ABRAMS, supra note 112, at 746–47.
114. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2012).
115. See, e.g., Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting
that the Posse Commitatus Act reflects “limits established by Congress on the use of
the military for civilian law enforcement”).
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tary activities.”116  Another section of that act explicitly identifies the
scope of the Posse Comitatus Act:
(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is
not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of
domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when . . .
the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is re-
quired to fulfill the President’s obligations under the Constitution to
respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious
emergency.
(5) Existing laws . . . grant the President broad powers that may be
invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack
against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and these
laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to
help restore public order.117
Thus, when the U.S. naval forces belatedly fired back at the attack-
ing Japanese warplanes over Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the
military was neither “execut[ing] the laws” nor “search[ing], seiz[ing],
arrest[ing]”; it was repelling an enemy attack.118  This is true even
though Congress would not declare war on Japan until the next day.119
Similarly, the U.S. Air Force pilots who were scrambled into the air on
September 11, 2001, were authorized to shoot down any additional
hijacked aircraft in U.S. airspace,120 even though congressional Au-
thorization to Use Military Force (“AUMF”) would not be passed un-
til September 18, 2001.
Whether anti-drone actions by U.S. military forces would violate
the Posse Comitatus Act therefore turns on the appropriate legal
characterization of such actions.  If defending against terrorist use of
UAVs is essentially a law enforcement action, then it would appear
that the Posse Comitatus Act is indeed triggered by, say, an Air Force
pilot’s shooting down a hostile drone.  This would be the case even
though one could argue that the military’s primary interest was in
stopping a terrorist threat, rather than making an arrest as the initial
step toward criminal prosecution.121
116. Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 876, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
117. Id. § 886.
118. Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (noting that “If a war be
made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound
to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the chal-
lenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”).
119. See Congressional Declaration of War on Japan, Dec. 8, 1941, available at
http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/japwar.shtml.
120. See 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 55, at 40–44.  Two sets of fighter planes
took off from different air bases; the ground control for the first set received the
shootdown order but did not pass it along to the pilots. See id. at 42–43.  However, the
second set of pilots did receive the shootdown order. See id. at 44.
121. For a related scenario, consider the use of military aircraft in 2002 to assist
local law enforcement agencies in capturing the so-called Beltway Sniper (which
turned out to be two males). As one commentator explained, “The Army can offer
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Of course, just because the Posse Comitatus Act is implicated does
not mean that it has been violated.  Apart from armed conflict, the
military can operate on domestic soil under a number of circum-
stances: (1) in the face of public insurrection, as provided for in the
Insurrection Act;122 (2) as an emergency response following a natural
disaster, as provided for in the Stafford Act;123 or (3) pursuant to any
other direct congressional authorization.
The Insurrection Act provides the President with advance statutory
authorization to use the military on domestic soil to respond to “an
insurrection in any State against its government,”124 to enforce federal
law in the face of obstruction or rebellion,125 or to break up interfer-
ence with state or federal law significant enough to deprive citizens of
civil rights.126  If there were a public uprising significant enough to
trigger the Insurrection Act and the uprising were to use weaponized
drones, then the Insurrection Act would appear to apply, but in the
instance of a single potentially hostile drone, there would not be the
circumstances triggering this statute.
The Stafford Act authorizes the President to use the military to as-
sist in responding to emergencies and major disasters.  As major disas-
ters involve natural catastrophes, that aspect of the Stafford Act
would not apply to drone terrorism.127  Emergencies are defined by
the Act as:
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and lo-
cal efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catas-
trophe in any part of the United States.128
A successful drone attack using some exotic chemical or radiological
agents could conceivably create enough of a hazard zone requiring
decontamination or other cleanup, for which federal assistance might
be necessary and for which the Stafford Act would be applicable.  But
that, of course, would be a post-attack use of the military, not defend-
intelligence, transportation, and logistical assistance to cops, but it can’t conduct
searches or make arrests.” See Philip Carter, Why Can the Army Help Cops Catch the
D.C. Sniper?, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2002/10/why_can_the_army_help_cops_catch_the_dc_sniper.html.
122. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–334 (2012); see generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency
Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 159–64 (2004).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2012).
124. 10 U.S.C. § 331.
125. Id. § 332.
126. Id. § 333.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2012) (defining major disasters); Ernest B. Abbott,
Representing Local Governments in Catastrophic Events: DHS/FEMA Response and
Recovery Issues, 37 URB. LAW. 467, 471 (2005).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2012). Notably, the Governor of the State must request
that the President declare an emergency in order to trigger the Stafford Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5191 (2012).
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ing against a drone attack.  The Stafford Act could conceivably come
into play ahead of time if the government were to learn of an impend-
ing drone attack with enough warning to be able to mobilize military
assets to detect, identify, and destroy that drone.  But where the threat
of a drone attack materializes out of nowhere, the Stafford Act would
not be of relevance.
Moreover, neither of those statutory overrides of the Posse Comita-
tus Act is sufficient to justify all uses of the military to defend against
drone terrorism where such defense is considered law enforcement.  A
terrorist group that has been operating stealthily up to the launching
of the attack for the first time, or a lone wolf terrorist doing so, will
not have provided any evidence of an insurrection.  And while a cata-
strophically successful drone terrorism attack may well throw the re-
gion into a state of chaos that would trigger the Stafford Act, this
statutory provision too would apply only afterward, not beforehand.
The other analytical fork is to consider that defense against drone
terrorism is a military action, as it surely would be if the drone were
piloted by an enemy nation’s air force during a state of armed conflict,
where the Posse Comitatus Act is of no relevance because the military
would be neither executing the laws nor searching, seizing, or arrest-
ing criminal suspects; it would be defending the nation from an
aggressor.129
Under this line of analysis, we next need to determine the lawful
source of authority for use of military force.  The conventional separa-
tion of powers view is that the President may use military force only
when specifically authorized by Congress or when facing an imminent
attack on the nation.130
129. In The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863), the Court stated that “If a war be made
by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to
resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority.” Id. at 668. Under this doctrine,
the President has the authority to repel imminent attacks even in the absence of con-
gressional authorization—and it goes without saying that the President would be us-
ing the military, as it is an exercise of war powers.
130. See Tung Yin, Structural Objections to the Inherent Commander-in-Chief Pow-
ers Thesis, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 965, 968–72 (2007) (citing and
discussing various sources, including John Hart Ely, Harold Koh, Louis Fisher, The
Steel Seizure Case, and the War Powers Resolution, on the need for congressional
authorization); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668 (noting the President’s authority and
obligation to repel imminent attacks).
A contrary separation of powers view, most notably associated with John Yoo, ar-
gues that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the military, does not need any
congressional authorization to sanction the use of the military; Congress’s control
over the President in this area is limited to its power to declare war (which brings
about a state of perfect, or total war, between the combatants) and to funding—or
refusing to fund—the military. See, e.g., JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the
Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2004); John C. Yoo, War and Constitutional
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As of this writing, the only active congressional authorizations for
use of military force are the 2001 authorization against al Qaeda and
the 2002 authorization against Iraq.131  It is possible that any hostile
attack by a UAV in U.S. airspace could be carried out by clandestine
al Qaeda operatives (much as how the 9/11 attacks were carried out)
or Iraqi agents still loyal to the deposed Saddam Hussein regime, in
which case one of the active AUMFs would indisputably authorize
responsive military action.
In many instances, the identity of the group behind a drone attack
will remain unknown to the U.S. government.  Perhaps in such in-
stances, at least at the outset, the government should act as if the at-
tack were launched by an entity covered by one of the two AUMFs.
At some point, however, the government may become aware that the
drone is being piloted by some hostile force that is not the subject of a
current AUMF.  After all, it is far from the case that all terrorism
threats faced by the United States come from Islamic fundamentalist
groups (and, even there, only a fraction of such groups fall within ei-
ther AUMF132); ACLU lawyer Mike German, who successfully infil-
trated various white supremacist groups as an FBI agent, argues that
the government has consistently ignored the serious threat of terror-
ism from right-wing white supremacist groups.133  And of course, the
deadliest terrorist incident on U.S. soil before the 9/11 attacks was the
Oklahoma City bombing, carried out by Timothy McVeigh, who
shared the anti-U.S. government view held by al Qaeda but little else,
his primary motivation apparently having been to avenge what he per-
ceived as the federal government’s role in the Waco firestorm that
killed Branch Davidian sect leader David Koresh and his followers.134
Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND
THE CONSTITUTION (2013) (disagreeing with Yoo’s historical analysis but arguing that
the Cold War brought about a constitutional level change in the President’s war pow-
ers).  For more discussion of the inherent Commander-in-Chief powers thesis, see
Yin, Structural Objections, supra, at 972–76.
131. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.  The United States has not declared war since World
War II, most likely because the United Nations Charter banned war as a matter of
international law. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authori-
zation and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060–62 (2005).
132. For example, the State Department has considered the Palestinian group
Hamas to be a terrorist organization since 1997, see Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm, but unless there is
evidence that Hamas somehow assisted al Qaeda in planning or carrying out the 9/11
attacks, or harbored al Qaeda, it is not a target of the 2001 AUMF. Cf. Jennifer
Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY L.J. 115,
115–16 (2014) (“[D]espite widespread misrepresentations to the contrary, Congress
pointedly refused to declare a ‘war on terrorism.’”).
133. See, e.g., MIKE GERMAN, THINKING LIKE A TERRORIST: INSIGHTS OF A FOR-
MER FBI UNDERCOVER AGENT 65–66 (2007).
134. See MICHEL & HERBECK, supra note 49, at 379–80.  Indeed, McVeigh was
likely the exact type of terrorist who would find drones to be an attractive weapon for
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL405.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-MAR-16 10:35
662 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the existing AUMFs would authorize
any and all military actions to shoot down potentially hostile drones.
Congress could, of course, enact a new AUMF that would provide
the President with advanced legal authorization to shoot down any
unidentified UAVs in U.S. airspace, but to be effective such an AUMF
would have to be written without specifying the identity of the targets,
only the particular method of attack.  This would be a much broader
AUMF than any previous ones, as it really would be tantamount to a
“war on terrorism” in a legal sense as opposed to the rhetorical sense
in which President Bush often spoke.  By contrast, past AUMFs or
their functional equivalents, including declarations of war, have iden-
tified specific enemies.135  Even the controversial 2001 AUMF against
al Qaeda, which engendered criticism for elevating a non-state group
to the equivalent status of a nation-state,136 defined an enemy in terms
of group membership, as opposed to a tactic or conduct.  The phrase
“war on terrorism” (or its variations) was easily derided as being le-
gally meaningless, akin to the “war on drugs” or the “war on
poverty.”137
Without such a broad AUMF, the President might seem legally
helpless to order military action against potentially hostile drones
launched by unknown persons because there would not be a specific
AUMF in place.  However, the repel doctrine recognized the Presi-
dent’s authority and obligation to defend the nation against imminent
attacks.138  If, hypothetically, Iran were to launch a squadron of seem-
ingly hostile UAVs in U.S. airspace toward key government and pri-
vate buildings, public stadiums, and major amusement parks, the
President surely would be entitled to order fighter planes scrambled
for air defense without congressional authorization, just as U.S. Forces
on Pearl Harbor could have fired defensively against the Japanese
planes even before the first bomb or torpedo had been dropped or
launched, well before the American declaration of war against Japan
and without knowing whether the planes with red circles on the wings
were on an official mission or under a rogue command.  The key point
is that, ex ante, the military does not know the source behind a poten-
causing mass panic and perhaps even casualties, while insulating the operator from
discovery.
135. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. 102-1.
136. See Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist At a Time: A Non-
criminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 153 & n.14 (2005) (citing sources).
137. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 40 (2006).
138. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (“If a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist
force by force.  He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority.”).
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tial drone threat.  International law also recognizes this type of pre-
emptive self-defense—attacking suspected hostile forces before
actually being fired upon—when the perceived threat is “instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”139
To be sure, all of this discussion is likely academic in the sense that
it is extremely doubtful that anyone would be able to enforce a restric-
tive view of the President’s authority to defend the nation.  The most
likely complainant would be the owner of a (wrongfully) downed
UAV, who might conceivably sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), claiming negligence in shooting down a non-hostile
aircraft.140
The FTCA waived the United States’ sovereign immunity over ordi-
nary tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances,”141 so would seem to be
an appropriate vehicle for litigating such a negligence-based claim.
However, it comes with a number of exceptions, one of which is
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”142  In a tragic
incident roughly analogous, from a legal standpoint, to the hypotheti-
cal shoot down of an innocuous drone mistaken for a hostile aircraft,
the U.S.S. Vincinnes shot down an Iranian passenger jet in 1988 out of
a mistaken belief that the target was on an attack path; the almost 300
people on the plane all died.143  When family members of some of the
passengers and crew brought suit against the United States under the
FTCA, claiming negligence in the operation of the warship, the
United States successfully invoked the combatant activities exception.
At the time, there was no declared state of war or armed conflict be-
tween the United States and Iran; rather, Iran and Iraq were at war,
during which Iran began attacking cargo ships bound for Iraq from
Kuwait, leading Kuwait to seek assistance from the United States.144
U.S. and Iranian warships exchanged fire sporadically for over a year
before the passenger jet shoot-down incident; and in fact, just before
the passenger jet took off, the Vincennes had fired upon Iranian gun-
139. Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Stephen Fox, in 1 THE PAPERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841–43, at 62 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed.,
1983).
140. Another possibility is a Bivens claim brought directly under the Fourth
Amendment.  As Stephen Vladeck persuasively argues, courts should be—but typi-
cally are not—solicitous toward such claims in national security cases. See Stephen I.
Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255,
276 (2010).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
143. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 1330.
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boats.145  In affirming the dismissal of the lawsuit, the Ninth Circuit
explained that:
The combatant activities exception applies whether U.S. military
forces hit a prescribed or an unintended target, whether those se-
lecting the target act wisely or foolishly, whether the missiles we
employ turn out to be “smart” or dumb, whether the target we
choose performs the function we believe it does or whether our
choice of an object for destruction is a result of error or miscalcula-
tion. In other words, it simply does not matter for purposes of the
“time of war” exception whether the military makes or executes its
decisions carefully or negligently, properly or improperly. It is the
nature of the act and not the manner of its performance that counts.
Thus, for purposes of liability under the FTCA, it is of no signifi-
cance whether a plane that is shot down is civilian or military, so
long as the person giving the order or firing the weapon does so for
the purpose of furthering our military objectives or of defending
lives, property, or other interests. To put it in the terms of the stat-
ute, the only question that need be answered is whether the chal-
lenged action constituted combatant activity during time of war.146
As to whether the shooting down of the passenger jet constituted
combatant activity during war time despite the absence of explicit
congressional authorization, the court concluded that “when, as a re-
sult of a deliberate decision by the executive branch, United States
armed forces engage in an organized series of hostile encounters on a
significant scale with the military forces of another nation, the FTCA
exception applies.”147
To be sure, in the drone terrorism hypothetical, the encounter is not
clearly against the military force of another nation, although that fact
may not be immediately clear at the time that government agents
must decide whether to take action against a potentially hostile drone.
And a single drone that may or may not be engaged in an act of ter-
rorism would not appear to rise to the level of “hostile encounters on
a significant scale.”  Yet, it has become commonplace to say that eve-
rything changed after 9/11, including concepts of war time and peace
time.148
Federal courts have generally been reluctant to adjudicate issues of
whether a state of war exists even when there is no explicit congres-
sional authorization for the use of military force.  For example, in the
run-up to the First Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush ordered
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and equipment to the Middle
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1335–36.
147. Id. at 1335.
148. See, e.g., MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 112–20 (2012).  As Dudziak writes, “Post-9/11 scholarship has persisted in
the assumption that normality is a state of existence outside times of danger.” Id. at
114.
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East as part of Operation Desert Shield without an AUMF, leading to
multiple lawsuits filed in federal court challenging his authority to do
so.  In Dellums v. Bush, about 10% of the members of Congress
sought an injunction to block the President from attacking Iraq before
securing Congress’s assent.149  The district judge denied the injunction
on the grounds that it was not ripe because a majority of Congress had
not voted either way on an AUMF.150  In Ange v. Bush, a U.S. soldier
sought a similar injunction so that he could not be ordered over-
seas.151  A different district judge concluded that the case presented a
political question federal courts were institutionally incapable of
resolving.152
For anyone else, there would seem to be additional justiciability
barriers to any judicial check on the President.  Unlike the hypotheti-
cal drone operator who has suffered a concrete loss of property, any-
one else complaining about the use of the military to defend against
potential drone terrorism would have a hard time establishing Article
III standing, which is the requirement that the plaintiff have suffered a
concrete harm caused by the defendant and redressable by court or-
der.153  Where a plaintiff has suffered no specific individual harm,
courts have generally concluded that the plaintiff is raising a “genera-
lized grievance” and declined to reach the merits of the case.154
Furthermore, in the calm period before there is any threat of an
attack, any lawsuit seeking an injunction against military action absent
congressional authorization would fail for lack of ripeness, and once a
potential attack has triggered a military response, any lawsuit is un-
likely to be resolved before the threat has ended (either because it
was a successful attack, it was a false alarm, or the drone was shot
down).  Analytically, the dilemma is very similar to that faced by the
plaintiff in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, where Adolph Lyons, the
victim of a police chokehold, brought a civil rights action seeking an
injunction against the Los Angeles Police Department’s further use of
the chokehold.  The Supreme Court held that Lyons could not show
that he was likely to be subjected to the chokehold again and, hence,
lacked standing to pursue his claim for relief.155  If Lyons were sub-
jected to a chokehold again, presumably he would then have standing
149. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
150. Id. at 1151 (requiring “that the plaintiffs in an action of this kind be or re-
present a majority of the Members of the Congress”).
151. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
152. Id. at 514 (“Ange asks the court to delve into and evaluate those areas where
the court lacks the expertise, resources, and authority to explore. . . . Time and again
courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction in such cases and undertake such determi-
nations because courts are ill-equipped to do so.”).
153. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–76 (1974) (holding
that taxpayer had no standing to sue Congress for compliance with the Public Ac-
counting clause of the Constitution, in order to obtain the CIA’s annual budget).
155. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–07 (1983).
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to sue, except, of course, he would find it prohibitively difficult at that
moment to get into court because he would be passing out...156
2. National Guard units—A second option is for a local National
Guard unit to operate anti-drone weaponry.  So long as the Guard
unit remains under control of the governor of the state in which it is
based (as opposed to being called up by the President), it is not con-
sidered to be part of the Army or Air Force for the purposes of the
Posse Comitatus Act.157
3. Civilian law enforcement use—Another option is to equip local or
state law enforcement officials with the requisite military equipment
or even indirect support so long as the military is not actually engaged
in law enforcement activities.  There has been a several-decades-long
history of military equipment being loaned to civilian law enforce-
ment, primarily for drug interdiction purposes.158  Congress further fa-
cilitated such loans through the Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Officials Act,159 which gave a congressional imprimatur
to such cooperation.  As the Eighth Circuit has noted, the policy rea-
son favoring such lending is to “improve the efficiency of civilian law
enforcement by giving it the benefit of military technologies, equip-
ment, information, and training personnel.”160
Later, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, Congress
amended Title 10 (dealing with the U.S. military) to permit the out-
right sale or donation to law enforcement agencies of excess military
equipment, with preference for transfers to be used for “counter-drug
and counter-terrorism activities.”161  In recent years, the face value of
annual donations through the so-called 1033 program has been around
a half-billion dollars or more, largely in the form of small arms, am-
munition, and armored vehicles, all presumably due to the drawdown
of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.162
156. To the extent that Lyons sounds like a ridiculous result, one should keep in
mind that Lyons did not lack standing to pursue damages for the chokehold that he
already suffered.  The standing problem related only to the claim for injunctive relief.
Id. at 112–13.
157. See United States v. Gilbert, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 1997).
158. See, e.g., Peter M. Sanchez, The “Drug War”: The U.S. Military and National
Security, 34 A.F. L. REV. 109, 123 (1991); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comi-
tatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383,
408–14 (2003).
159. Pub. L. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1115 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 372(2012)).
160. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d en banc, 800 F.2d
812 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
161. Pub. L. 104-201, § 1033, 110 Stat. 2639–40 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2576 (2012)).
162. See Niall McCarthy, Chart: Pentagon Donations to Police Are Skyrocketing,
FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:21 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2014/08/
15/chart-pentagon-donations-to-police-are-skyrocketing/; Shawn Musgrave et al., The
Pentagon Finally Details its Weapons-for-Cops Giveaway: Bellying up to the arsenal,
MUCKROCK NEWS (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/
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However, it is unlikely that Section 1033 transfers will involve anti-
drone equipment in the near future because the program applies only
to excess—i.e., surplus—military equipment.  The statutory provision
explicitly bars spending Defense Department funds in furtherance of
the transfers.163  Thus, the Defense Department would not be able to
spend federal funds to buy additional anti-drone military equipment
to donate or sell to local law enforcement agencies.
V. SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
One terrorism analyst has written that “[i]t is clearly impossible to
protect all potential targets from covert [nuclear, biological, and
chemical] attacks all the time, and this should not be attempted.”164
The same reality is true when it comes to protecting the United States
from terrorism via small drones.  The cost of maintaining real-time
surveillance across the entire nation, along with the necessary equip-
ment to disable any potentially hostile drones, would be far higher
than we can probably afford realistically, at least given current tech-
nologies.  Nevertheless, the fact that we are unable to defend every
area of the country against potential drone terrorism need not mean
that we should take no steps at all, unless even the most basic steps
are of little utility relative to cost.
A. Require FAA Registration and Use of Transponders
Currently, AC 91-57 sets the threshold for small drones/remote-con-
trolled aircraft at fifty-five pounds, a threshold that the FAA Modern-
ization and Reform Act and subsequent FAA regulations have left
intact.  Heavier planes require an airworthiness certificate from the
FAA, but lighter ones only need to stay below 400 feet and away from
parks, churches, and schools.  Considering that this regulation is over
thirty years old and has not kept up with modern developments, both
technological (the availability and utility of small drones) and socio-
logical (the increasing trend toward nihilistic terrorism aimed at mass
casualties as opposed to political statements), it would be an appropri-
ate time for the FAA to revisit the regulation of small remote-con-
trolled planes/drones.
This is likely to be an ongoing process because the threshold for
which a small drone poses a sufficiently reasonable likelihood of being
used as a vehicle for terrorism will change as smaller and smaller
drones gain the ability to carry payloads that today would require
larger drones.  Besides explosives, drone terrorism might employ radi-
oactive material such as cesium-137 as a radiological attack,
dec/04/pentagon-finally-details-its-weapons-cops-giveaway/ (compiling database of all
donations/sales received through this program, sorted by law enforcement agency).
163. Nat’l Defense Authorization Act, § 1033(b)(3) (1996).
164. FALKENRATH ET AL., supra note 45, at 7.
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weaponized anthrax or other biological pathogens,165 or chemical
agents.166  To be sure, it is far from clear that small drones are an
appropriate, or even effective, means of dispersing radiological, chem-
ical, or biological agents to inflict mass casualties.167  However, as the
scenario in the introduction to this Article suggests, even ineffective
use of chemical or biological agents could cause panic and resulting
deaths.168
As discussed earlier, transponder-based identification systems offer
a number of advantages over primary radar system.169  The FAA
could mandate the use of a transponder in a drone to broadcast posi-
tional, directional, and identifying information, including contact in-
formation for the operator.  That way, if a drone were to wander over
a packed stadium or other sensitive location, local authorities could
attempt to reach the operator to warn him or her to alter course im-
mediately or else risk offensive action against the drone.170
Extension of the transponder requirement to smaller UAVs has
three drawbacks from the standpoint of the remote pilots: cost,
weight, and power draw.  By way of example, one aircraft transponder
advertised as “the world’s smallest and lightest Mode S certified GA
transponder[ ]” in early 2015 costs at least $2,345 and weighs almost a
pound.171  An extra pound of weight is negligible for a larger aircraft,
but perhaps not for a small UAV.  The added weight will either reduce
the drone’s flight time or will require more power.  Since more power
165. In late 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, various designated targets, including televi-
sion journalists and federal politicians, received letters laced with anthrax spores that
were capable of spreading locally in the air. See, e.g., PHILIPP SARASIN, ANTHRAX:
BIOTERROR AS FACT AND FANTASY 30–32 (Giselle Weiss trans., 2006); William J.
Broad, Contradicting Some U.S. Officials, 3 Scientists Call Anthrax Powder High-
Grade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B6. Five people, mostly postal workers, died
after contracting inhalation anthrax. See Scott Shane, FBI, Laying Out Evidence,
Closes Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at A1.
166. In 1995, a Japanese doomsday cult unleashed a terrorist attack in the Tokyo
subway system with the nerve gas sarin, killing twelve and injuring about a thousand
others. See, e.g., K. Ganesan et al., Chemical Warfare Agents, 2 J. PHARM. BIOALLIED
SCI. 166 (2010).  While chemical weapons are difficult to use and have historically
proven less effective than conventional explosives against prepared troops, “they can
be devastating against unprotected civilian populations. . . .” Matthew Meselson, The
Myth of Chemical Superweapons, BULLETIN, Apr. 1991, at 12, 15.
167. A small drone would not be an effective vehicle for launching a chemical
weapons attack based on the estimate that “[a]bout one ton of nerve gas . . . is re-
quired to produce heavy casualties among unprotected people in an open target one
kilometer square.” Meselmon, supra note 166, at 13.
168. Although not due to terrorism, a New Year’s Eve stampede in Shanghai,
China, that left thirty-six people dead and nearly fifty injured provides an example of
the tragedy that panic can cause. See David Barboza, In Moments, New Year’s Revelry
Became Fatal Crush in Shanghai, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2015, at A1.
169. See supra Part IV.B.
170. This use of transponders reduces the effectiveness of a stolen transponder, as
the contact information would be for the rightful owner, not the thief.
171. See TRIG TT21 MODE S TRANSPONDER, AIRCRAFTSPURCE, http://www.
aircraftspruce.com/catalog/avpages/trigtt21.php.
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means more batteries or more fuel, the drone will have to add even
more of either.  As for powering the transponder, one drone expert
explains that “almost all transponders use power as if it’s freely availa-
ble—they don’t have batteries in mind as the sole power source.”172
Feeding that transponder therefore will require additional batteries or
fuel (or result in a reduction in flight time), which, as has been seen,
creates a recursive problem of needing to add even more batteries or
fuel.
There is reason to believe that technological innovation will address
all three concerns.  As far as weight is concerned, there already are
working prototypes of transponders that weigh less than four
ounces.173  If demand for light, low-power consumption transponders
were to increase due to an FAA mandate for at least some of the
drones lighter than fifty-five pounds, then the cost for such transpon-
ders would likely begin to drop, especially given the general pattern of
price drops for high-tech equipment once adoption has become
widespread.174
Admittedly, one would not expect a would-be terrorist to comply
with the transponder requirement or, if he did comply, to respond to
any attempts to reach him.  But by not complying or not responding,
the operator would essentially give the go-ahead to local authorities
(or the military) to shoot down the drone.  (If the would-be terrorist
has stolen or spoofed a transponder from a legitimate drone operator,
the local authorities would end up contacting that person, who would
presumably deny knowledge of the drone flight in question.)
B. Restrict Airspace Above High-Value Targets
If the nation is going to arrange anti-drone defenses, it will need to
prioritize the defense of likely, high-value targets over less likely ones.
A large, open-air sports stadium filled with fans makes a far more
inviting objective for a drone attack than a neighborhood of single-
family homes, if nothing else because the latter has a much lower den-
sity of persons per square mile of area. Sporting events, music con-
certs, and other special events at outdoor arenas are not the only
potentially desirable targets of drone terrorism.  For open-air loca-
tions with large crowds (i.e., high population density), it would be
172. See also Eric Greenwell, A Guide to Transponders in Sailplanes – 2010B, at 7
(Jan. 2010), http://www.soaringsafety.org/prevention/Guide-to-transponders-in-sail
planes-2010B.pdf.
173. See Thomas Black, Crash-Proofing Drones: The Tech Race is On, BLOOM-
BERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 5, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-
05/crash-proofing-is-drone-industrys-big-challenge.
174. See, e.g., Michael Feroli, US: is IT over?, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA, ECO-
NOMIC RESEARCH NOTE 13–14 (Jan. 11, 2013) (noting a recent decline in the drop in
pricing for IT equipment, following a period when “I.T. prices declined at an ex-
tremely rapid pace during the 1990s”).
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hard to top popular amusement parks like Disney World and
Disneyland.175
It should be noted that national security policymakers have typi-
cally not resorted to this sort of triage, even during the government
reorganization leading up to the creation of the Department of Home-
land Security, which presented an ideal opportunity for contemplation
of the relative risks of terrorism that different areas of the country
faced.  Thus, New York Times columnist Paul Krugman complained
bitterly in 2003 that “[t]he federal government spends much more pro-
tecting the average resident of Wyoming from terrorists than it spends
protecting the average resident of New York City.”176  And Professors
John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart have argued similarly that the fed-
eral government has classified too many potential targets as “critical
infrastructure,”177 watering down the term to uselessness (much like
highlighting every line on a page of text).
For its part, the FAA has recognized that the airspace above sport-
ing events and other large public gatherings needs to be restricted
from private aircraft, issuing “circulars” that prohibit private aircraft
from flying over such arenas starting an hour before the event until an
hour afterward.178  The FAA does issue waivers from the restriction;
thus, airplanes involved in producing aerial television coverage, for
example, receive authorization to fly over stadiums.179  Not surpris-
ingly, the FAA has issued separate circulars restricting the airspace
above both Disney parks indefinitely.180  Strangely, the two Disney
parks are the only large amusement parks that have received such
FAA circulars181—a deficiency that the FAA should remedy.
Of course, these circulars are simply administrative orders, and
there is no reason to believe that would-be terrorists would even be
aware of them, much less obey them.  The circulars are analogous to a
temporary and geographically limited ban on handguns, such as a
175. Disneyland, for example, had nearly 16 million visitors in 2012, which averages
to over 40,000 per day. See Hugo Martin, Disney Park Crowding Reveals Options:
Hike rates or expand, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-disneyland-passes-20140521-story.html.  Having gone running around the outside of
Disneyland and California Adventure numerous times, I can attest that the external
perimeter around both parks measures only about three miles total.
176. Paul Krugman, Dust and Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at A19, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/26/opinion/26KRUG.html.
177. John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of
Homeland Security, 7 HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 6 (2011).
178. See, e.g., FAA NOTAM FDC 4/2621 (Oct. 27, 2014), http://tfr.faa.gov/
save_pages/detail_4_3621.html.
179. Id.
180. See FAA NOTAM FDC 4/3634 (Oct. 27, 2014), http://tfr.faa.gov/save_pages/
detail_4_3634.html; FAA NOTAM FDC 4/3635 (Oct. 27, 2014), http://tfr.faa.gov/
save_pages/detail_4_3635.html.
181. See Barmini Chakraborty, No Carpet Rides Here: Disney Keeps No-fly Zone
Over Parks, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/16/
no-fly-zone-rules-bent-for-disney/.
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“gun free zone.”182  While gun free zone designations have not pre-
vented mass shootings,183 the logistical difficulties in detecting the
presence of guns in such locations are far greater than those involved
in detecting drones above restricted airspace.  This is true because
people carry firearms, and gun free zones do not bar people from en-
try; absent some way of detecting firearms on people,184 a person can
bring a firearm into a school zone without necessarily arousing suspi-
cion. Under the FAA circular, on the other hand, any unauthorized
drone in restricted airspace is presumptively suspicious.
C. Establish Statutory Authorization and Rules of Engagement for
Anti-Drone Responses
As discussed previously, the current challenges to defending against
drone terrorism are most acute with regard to detecting and neutraliz-
ing them.  Assuming that we have the technological infrastructure in
place to detect and neutralize small drones, identification presents less
of a challenge because we do not have to be 100% accurate, so long as
the mistakes are false positives (i.e., misidentifying an innocuous
drone as a hostile one) rather than false negatives.185  This dynamic
points in favor of an “if in doubt, bring it down” strategy, at least in
the airspace above high-value targets.
Statutory authorization would resolve the question identified earlier
about exactly who is responsible for operating the equipment that
would be used to destroy or neutralize renegade drones.  Through leg-
islation such as the Stafford Act and the Insurrection Act, Congress
has already demonstrated the ability to preauthorize the President to
use military troops when calamitous events occur without having to
suffer delays occasioned by repeat, subsequent authorization.
To the extent that drone defense would presently require military
equipment not generally available to local law enforcement agencies,
Congress could remove all doubt as to the lawfulness of such actions
182. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2014).
183. One study by a gun control-favoring group, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, con-
cedes that 33% of the mass shootings between 2009 and 2013 occurred in gun free
zones. See Mass Shootings Since January 20, 2009, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS,
2, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/files/2013/02/mass_shootings
_2009-13_-_jan_29_12pm1.pdf.
184. For example, some schools have placed metal detectors at their schools. See,
e.g., Michael Ferraracio, Metal Detectors in the Public Schools: Fourth Amendment
Concerns, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 209, 216–25 (1999) (discussing cases opining on the use of
handheld metal detectors in schools); Robert S. Johnson, Metal Detector Searches: An
Effective Means to Help Keep Weapons Out of Schools, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 197, 200–01
(2000) (arguing in favor of the use of metal detectors at schools).
185. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIEN-
TIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 75–76 (1999) (describing false posi-
tives and false negatives and the trade-off involved in minimizing one at the expense
of the other).
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by enacting the tactic-based AUMF discussed earlier.186  While such
an AUMF would admittedly be broader than those enacted in the
past, it would still be a far cry from the rhetorical “war on terrorism”
that has drawn criticism and derision in the past.  It would apply
to a very specific set of factual circumstances that are easily ascer-
tainable and not particularly susceptible to manipulation or
misinterpretation.187
Even in the absence of such an AUMF, a President intent on shoot-
ing down a potentially hostile drone would be expected to do so and
claim authority under the Repel Doctrine.  On September 11, 2001,
for example, after the first three hijacked airplanes had already
crashed into their targets, President Bush and Vice President Cheney
reportedly agreed that combat aircraft being scrambled should be
given permission to shoot down any remaining hijacked airplanes in
the Washington, D.C., area.188  But an AUMF in place would provide
a President with a more solid legal basis by placing him or her in the
first category of the famous Steel Seizure formulation (where the Pres-
ident’s power is at its maximum because it has been augmented by
congressional authorization), as opposed to the second category
(where the President is acting on his or her own power, in the face of
silence from Congress).189  The difference between the shoot-down
order on September 11, 2001, and in the hypothetical involving drone
terrorism is that in the former incident three planes had already been
used as suicide weapons, demonstrating beyond a doubt that the coun-
try was being attacked and making the possibility of imminent further
attacks at least plausible, if not likely.  In the drone terrorism scenario,
the question is whether an unknown drone is in fact hostile, without
any other context.
D. Establish Joint Task Forces
In further preparation for responding to potential drone terrorism,
the federal government should establish joint task forces to coordinate
federal and local law enforcement agencies and the military.  There
already exist such joint task forces between federal and local law en-
forcement agencies for counterterrorism purposes, which join the fed-
eral government’s wider variety of surveillance tools (such as foreign
intelligence surveillance warrants) with local police departments’
186. See supra Part IV.
187. By contrast, a far more problematic tactic-based AUMF would be one target-
ing “terrorism.” Although terrorism is in fact a defined term in federal law, see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2014); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2014), those definitions include politi-
cal motivations, which would require more interpretation and conjecture, compared
to the fact of a drone breaching restricted airspace.
188. See 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 55, at 40–42.
189. See Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL405.txt unknown Seq: 39 11-MAR-16 10:35
2015] DEFENDING AGAINST DRONE TERRORISM 673
larger staffing and greater engagement with the community.190  Joint
task forces also promote information sharing, which is a not insignifi-
cant consideration when it comes to counterterrorism.191  The 9/11
Commission documented how the lack of information sharing be-
tween the CIA and the FBI enabled two of the 9/11 hijackers to oper-
ate within the United States despite having been tracked overseas.192
Joint task forces may also promote more effective responses to
drone terrorism.  This is not a novel concept.  With regard to exotic
forms of terrorism, the Clinton Administration considered forming an
elite task force consisting of ten teams of specialists based in ten dif-
ferent states, with each task force being trained to respond to chemi-
cal or biological attacks.193
VI. CONCLUSION
Drone terrorism probably remains, for now, a very low probability
event.  But as small private drones become more commonplace and
capable of carrying larger payloads, the likelihood of drone terrorism
will only increase.  Officials will almost certainly be unable to detect
and stop every such attempt, just as they are unable to detect and stop
every attempt at other forms of terrorism.  Officials can, however,
take steps to improve our chances of disrupting drone attacks.  Some
of those steps are technological in nature but some are legal in nature.
This Article has suggested some legal steps that could be taken now or
in the near future so that doubts about legal authority or other related
concerns are not obstacles to effective drone defense.
190. See, e.g., Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security
vs. Civil Liberties Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011).
191. Id. at 6–17.
192. See id.
193. Jim Landers, U.S. Quietly Upgrading Homeland Defense Plan, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1A, available at http://devvy.net/pdf2/october2012/Dallas
.pdf.
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